Toward a European System of Appellate Courts by Rasmussen, Hjalte
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 3 
1979 
Toward a European System of Appellate Courts 
Hjalte Rasmussen 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the European Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hjalte Rasmussen, Toward a European System of Appellate Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 365 (1979). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol77/iss3/7 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
TOWARD A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF 
APPELLATE COURTS 
Hjalte Rasmussen* 
EUROPEAN LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Edited by F.G. Jacobs. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. 1976. Pp. xi, 211. 
$21.75. 
The issue of individual rights has become one of substantial 
interest and concern in the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and it is the subject of this book. Although the book's title 
is ambitious and the table of contents reveals that the' subject is 
approached in a variety of ways, it can hardly be said that this 
book covers all aspects of the rights of the individual under Com-
munity law. After all, if this book were really meant to explore 
all the title implies, would it not ultimately be necessary to 
describe the entire legal system of the Communities? Even if 
measured by more modest standards, however, the book's cover-
age is far from all-embracing. Actually, as the Foreword suggests, 
these ten papers, which were first presented at a workshop held 
in 1975 by the University of London's Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, concentrate on only two, albeit broad, facets of 
individual rights. 1 
Specifically, the essays emphasize that 'aspect of Community 
Law that could loosely be termed "social." In the interest of 
precision, I should certainly mention, however, that one can find 
in several of the essays, particularly in "The European Social 
Charter," discussions of many important aspects of labor law. 
* Visiting Research Scholar, University of Michigan. Law Degree 1966, University of 
Copenhagen; Ph.D. 1975, University of Aarhus, Denmark. 
1. The papers include The Legal Protection of Private Parties in the Law of the 
European Communities, by W. van Gerven (pp. 1-17); ·The International Scope of the 
Community Provisions Concerning Free Movements of Workers (with Special Reference 
to the Law of the United Kingdom), by T.C. Hartley (pp. 19-37); An Incipient Form of 
European Citizenship, by R. Plender (pp. 39-53); Conflicts of Law in Matters of Social 
Security Under the EEC Treaty, by K. Lipstein (pp. 55-77); Recent Decisions of the Court 
of Justice in the Field of Free Movement of Persons and Free Supply of Services, by P. 
Leleux (pp. 79-93); The Mutual Recognition of Qualifications in the EEC, by R. Wagen-
baur (pp. 95-112). Professors of Law Eric Stein and G. Joseph Vining, the only Americans 
to participate in the workshop, co-authored Citizens' Access to Judicial Review of Admin-
istrative Action in a Transnational and Federal Context (pp. 113-43). The remaining 
papers are The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community, by M. Hilf (pp. 145-
60); Remedies in the United Kingdom: Some Practical Problems of Direct Applicability, 
by Solicitor Lawrence Collins (pp. 161-79); and The European Social Charter, by 0. 
Kahn-Freund (pp. 181-211). The editor, Francis G. Jacobs, is Professor of Law at King's 
College in London. 
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Moreover, van Gerven's essay and Stein and Vining's contain 
important contributions to the study of Community procedural 
law. (I shall return to the latter in great detail below.) 
In sum, the reader will find selective discussions of the sub-
stantive social and labor law, and of related aspects of the proce-
dural law of the European Communities and other European 
sources of law.2 All the essays, according to the Foreword, are 
concerned mainly with the gradual enlargement of the legal pro-
tection of the individual as a result of certain far-reaching deci-
sions of the European Community's Court of Justice. 
From what has already been said, it is obvious that I cannot 
review all the essays without resorting to Procrustean techniques, 
and the ten essays in this book certainly deserve better. For ex-
ample, Trevor Hartley took up the problem of the international 
effects of Community law on movements of workers when that 
subject-matter was still an area of Community law largely unpen-
etrated by other scholars. Similarly, Hilfs "The Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in the Community" embodied considerable 
new information and research, for only shortly before he pre-
sented his paper had discussion begun about how and by whom 
the fundamental rights of the individual should be protected 
under Community law. Since the time of Hilfs essay, however, 
the issue of fundamental rights has evoked perhaps the most 
important developments in the Community and its law.3 
The other fine essays notwithstanding, the rest of this review 
will look at the contribution of Stein and Vining.4 Their ques-
tion-why the Court of Justice has limited the access of private 
parties to judicial review under article 173, paragraph 2, of the 
2. "Community law" and the "Law of the Communities" are interchangeable with 
"European law" and are often used in its stead. The term "European law" also embraces, 
however, non-national European law which stems from sources other than the European 
Communities. Although the foreword refers to the, subject of the book as "the area of 
Community law which can loosely be called 'soc'ial,'" several of the essays concern 
issues which would better be described as "European law." For instance, two of the essays 
largely discuss laws of the United Kingdom. Collins, supra note 2; Hartley, supra note 2. 
Also, Kahn-Freund's The European Social Charter, supra note 2, argues for the use of 
the broader term "European law." 
· 3. See, e.g., Golsong, 1st der Katalog der in Europii'isehen M enschenrechtskonuention 
erhaltenen Grundrechte fur die EG anwendbar?, ZEITSCHRIFI' FOR GRUNDRECHTE 346-61 
(1978); Schermers, The Communities Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
1978/1 LEGAL, lssUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1; L'Indiuiduet le droit Europeen (1976) 
(published papers from the Seventh International Congress for European Law held in 
Brussels on oct. 2-4, 1976, under th auspices of the International Association for European 
Law). 
4. The chapter by Stein and Vining is also printed in 70 AM. J. INTL. L. 219 (1976). 
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EEC Treaty-is among those which have caused the most gallons 
of ink to flow. To my knowledge, however, they are the first to 
attempt a full account of the reasons the Court may have had 
when denying that access. 
To answer the question whether the Court should change its 
case law on this issue, it would seem of the greatest importance 
to understand initially what the underlying rationale for its nar-
row definition of that access has been. Happily, the authors' cata-
logue of explanations is exceedingly thoughtful and broad in 
perspective. Their comparative treatment of access to judicial 
review of American and West German administrative actions 
highly enriches their study. While I acknowledge my debt to Stein 
and Vining for their pioneering effort, I must also admit my firm 
belief that their catalogue of explanations needs both expansion 
and modification. I even venture to suggest that the additional 
explanation I shall propose may be the most crucial one to a 
complete assessment of why the Court has denied standing to 
private parties. 
I contend that the Court's denial of direct access under arti-
cle 173, paragraph 2, is part of a grandiose plan to modify the 
Community's judicial system, and that the Court's ultimate goal 
is to act as the supreme appellate Court of the Community. In 
this design, the subordinate courts would be the courts and tri-
bunals of the nine Member States and the special courts of first 
instance which the Community might from time to time estab-
lish. I shall argue this hypothesis later. First I must establish 
some preliminary points of law and fact. Furthermore, Stein and 
Vining's presentation is so authoritative and thorough that I 
must, in my view, meet their arguments before asserting my own. 
Unlike the United States Constitution, which makes no pro-
vision for judicial ·review, the Treaties which established the 
Western European Communities expressly authorize the Court of 
Justice to rule on the validity of the Community's legal acts. 
Article 173, paragraph 1, empowers the Member States and Com-
munity Institutions to file suit for annulment of such acts. Article 
173, paragraph 2, governs the citizen's access to judical review. 
Another rather significant difference between the United 
States Constitution and the EEC Treaties is that the former 
granted only a limited original jurisdiction in the United States 
Supreme Court while e111powering Congress to vest in it appellate 
jurisdiction. The latter, on the contrary, provide the Court of 
Justice with a broad range of original powers but expressly forbid 
it from hearing cases other than those the Treaties designate. The 
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most important areas of the original jurisdiction granted by the 
Treaty are: (1) cases challenging the legality of acts by Com-
munity Institutions (article 173); (2) cases alleging a failure to act 
by one or more of the Community Institutions (article 175); (3) 
damage claims against the Community for injuries caused by its 
administrative and legislative acts (article 178); (4) claims by 
employees of Community institutions against their employers 
(article 179);5 and (5) actions brought by the Commission or a 
Member State against another Member State for a breach of a 
treaty obligation (articles 169-171). 
It is probably generally agreed that the Framers of the Treaty 
envisioned these actions as the primary remedies available to 
redress unconstitutional activities. However, to assure that the 
law of the Treaty would be uniformly applied in all the Member 
States, the Framers, in article 177, rested jurisdiction in the 
Court of Justice to issue preliminary rulings. According to this 
article, the courts of Member States may submit to the Court so-
called preliminary questions about the interpretation of the 
Treaty or the validity and the interpretation of the Community's 
legal acts. In an unbroken line of precedents, the Court has inter-
preted article 177 as encouraging cooperation between Com-
munity and Member State courts, but not, at least in principle, 
as allowing the Court to rule on the compatibility of national 
legislation with Community law. When presented a preliminary 
question, the Court of Justice is supposed to respond with an 
abstract interpretation of the relevant Community law. Even 
granting the Court's best intention not to trespass on the national 
courts' exclusive jurisdiction to find facts and to apply Com-
munity law to the case at hand, the Court has never, for practical 
reasons, been able to disregard totally the facts of a case. The 
Court has, however, enjoyed the advantage in such cases (com-
pared to cases it hears as first instance) that the facts will usually 
have been properly established and thoroughly discussed before 
the preliminary questions are submitted. 
Turning our attention now to Stein and Vining's article, I 
should begin by considering the extremely interesting finding 
which led them to delve anew into the old question of the limita-
tions on private parties' standing to sue under article 173. High-
lighting judicial decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany 
5. Approximately one-third of all the cases filed in the Court's register are "staff 
cases" brought by Community personnel. 
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and the United States, Stein and Vining establish that a citizen's 
ability to trigger judicial review is quite broad "in these more or 
less mature federations where the citizens are directly subject to 
federal and state law." Why then is the Court of Justice so reluc-
tant to extend the same protection to the European citizen? That 
citizen is undeniably the subject of a common law which daily 
affects him in a variety of important economic activities. Even if 
the EEC is not a "mature federation," the Court has said that it 
is "a new legal ordef'6 and not just" a new legal order of interna-
tional law," as Stein and Vining contend (p.115). 
A short explanation is required with respect to the authors' 
use of the term "administrative actions," for it is not at all clear 
what the term means in Community law. Stein and Vining re-
frain from defining the notion, which presumably should. be dis-
tinguished from legislative action. Both the Council and the 
Commission are empowered to legislate and administer, but re-
markably, no one has attempted to determine authoritatively by 
reference to origin, nature, or form precisely which acts are legis-
lative and which are administrative. These conceptual difficulties 
might explain why in a couple of instances the authors are less 
stringent than would be expected in distinguishing the two kinds 
of action (pp. 117 & 120). 
The authors repeatedly allude to the Community's origin in 
international law (p. 115), emphasizing in this way that the Com-
munity was created as a compact among sovereign states. Pre-
sumably these states, more or less instinctively, would have re-
jected the idea of giving private citizens standing before a non-
national court to claim rights vis-A-vis the states. Such a state-
oriented philosophy might have inspired the Court to interpret 
article 173, paragraph 2's standing requirements as narrowly as 
possible. The "compact-among-states" argument also suggests 
that the Court, given its modest background, should not dare to 
interpret citizens' access in broader terms than those undoubt-
edly warranted by the textual limitations of that article. This 
theory finds support in the Court's repeated statements that it is 
bound by the "clearly restrictive wording of Article 173 para 2,"7 
although on another occasion the Court declared that "the provi-
sion of the Treaty relevant to the right of action of the citizens 
should not be narrowly interpreted."8 
6. See, e.g., Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, [1964] C.M. L.R. 425. 
7. See Sgarlata v. Commission, [1965] E.C.R. 279, [1966] C.M. L.R. 315. 
8. See Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, [1963] E.C.R. 197, [1964] C.M. L.R. 29, 
46. 
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The authors, however, believe that the wording of article 173, 
paragraph 2, contemplated in isolation, is ambiguous enough to 
allow the Court considerable discretion to permit private stand-
ing to sue (p. 124). In this belief, they are no doubt right. Further, 
considering how often the Court has tainted its interpretations of 
the Treaty with interests other than those of the constituent 
states, Stein and Vining are correctly unpersuaded by the Court's 
textual argument. More precisely, the Court has often asserted its 
will in contravention of the will of the Framers, as more or less 
successfully expressed in the Treaty's different articles, and the 
Court has accordingly often been charged with usurping legisla-
tive power and with disregarding the rights of the Member States. 
Under these circumstances, one would certainly not be well ad-
vised to credit the Court's display of judicial modesty. Indeed, 
one might note that lawyers, scholars, and even the Court's own 
Advocates General have argued strongly for a broader definition 
of the citizen's access to judicial review of administrative and 
legislative action. Finally, whatever some of the Member States 
may have felt about their time as completely sovereign states 
under international law, the desirability of a strong Community 
judiciary must have been ardently advocated during the negotia-
. tions which ultimately led to the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Framers must have had 
at least two important concerns: to accord legal protection to the 
individual who would be subject to the powers they were creating 
and to create a judiciary strong enough to overcome what they 
expected to be formidable opposition from various powerful inter-
ests to the enforcement of Community laws. The Framers could 
have adopted the American solution by creating a hierarchy in 
which the Court of Justice was the highest appellate court and 
heard appeals from both federal courts and all the courts of the 
Member States. A second solution would have been to let the 
courts of the Member States enforce the common law, permitting 
appeal to the Court of Justice on all matters involving Com-
munity law. A third, plainly somewhat less effective, solution is 
the present one. If the present Court probably cannot assert itself 
against opposing interests to meet all the Community's need for 
a strong judiciary, it is nonetheless remarkably more powerful 
than any traditional transnational court or tribunal. This is so, 
not least, because the ECSC Court-and its successors-have an 
express power of judicial review which, compared with that of 
traditional non-nation courts, must be termed extraordinary. 
Also, the standing requirements on which the ECSC Treaty 
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conditions the citizen's right to trigger judicial review are not 
unreasonably burdensome. Finally, the credibility of the "com-
pact-among-states" argument suffers further by the fact that 
article 173, paragraph 2, specifically provides that any citizen 
"addressed" by an act of a Community institution may challenge 
the validity of that act. Since that argument neither alone nor in 
connection with the "textual" argument plausibly explains the 
Court's narrow construction of the almost self-evident meaning of 
article 173, paragraph 2's, standing requirement, the search for a 
convincing rationale must continue. 
Stein and Vining assume that the Court's interest in main-
taining the delicate balance between the power of Member States 
and of the Community accounts for its narrow construction of the 
standing requirement of a showing of "direct concern"(p. 120). 
They show that the Court's first French Advocate General, M. 
Gand, urged the Court to demonstrate "diplomatic courtesy" by 
not impairing state discretion and sovereignty. They properly 
ask, however, whether "the Court [can] seriously assert respect 
for States' rights and sovereignty when a plaintiff, claiming pres-
ent harm, is offering to show that the contested Community act 
is unlawful and thus cannot serve as the legal basis for further 
state action?" (p.122). The answer clearly ought to be that it 
cannot. Besides, it is unclear to me how the Court's annulment 
of a Community Institution's act could seriously impair state 
sovereignty. 
One might recall at this point that the Court has never 
earned high grades for diplomacy in its relations with Member 
States. In fact, the Court has conceded surprisingly little to Mem-
ber States in developing Community constitutional law. More-
over, occasional decisions that have appeared to defer to national 
interests later turned out to concentrate further the power of 
judicial review in the hands of the Court. With that note, I be-
lieve, we can leave the "sovereignty" arguments. 
Stein and Vining suggest that the Court may be reluctant to 
permit private parties access because it feels bound by a compari-
son of the relevant provisions of the ECSC and EEC treaties. The 
more restrictive language of the EEC Treaty may have led the 
Court to conclude that the Framers intended to restrict individ-
ual access, "presumably because of the much broader power to 
issue general regulations granted to the EEC institutions and the 
much wider range of persons affected by the EEC Treaty" (p. 
117). In the words of the Court, the changed wording indicates the 
Framers' intent not to accord the same protection under the EEC 
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Treaty-and they clearly did not mean to accord more-even 
though they were increasing both the Community's power and the 
number of people affected. But it seems peculiar to me, to say the 
least, to provide less protection in response to greater political 
power. Equally peculiar is how, without stating it unambig-
uously, the Framers could have expected that intent to be fol-
lowed by an independent judicial branch expressly vested with 
the right to exercise judicial review. If broad democratic controls 
had been simultaneously institutionalized at the Community 
level, this hypothesis might command some greater credibility, 
but no such attempt was ever made. Without such democratic 
controls-and perhaps even with them-the Court would unac-
ceptably cooperate with the political branches of government by 
maintaining a Community governed not by law but by politi-
cians. The Court would thereby manifestly disregard its article 
164 duty to ensure "that in the interpretation and application of 
this Treaty the law be observed." The "more power, less control" 
argument therefore cannot be accepted as a valid explanation. 
Perhaps the Court's unwillingness to permit direct private 
actions questioning the validity of Community acts is due to some 
fear that, by overturning a decision forged in the Council of Min-
isters by political compromise, the Court might paralyze the 
Council's ability to make decisions. This is not a risk, the argu-
ment would contend, that the Court should run. But this argu-
ment is improbable. First, there is no evidence that the Court 
shows any specific hesitance to strike down fragile political com-
promises where their validity is questioned under the pre-
liminary-question procedure of article 177. Why then should the 
Court hesitate more to invalidate such an act directly? Second, 
to the extent the Court does take into account the instability that 
might result from invalidating a political compromise, it properly 
ought to and in fact does so when deciding the substance of the 
case. 
Moreover, the EEC Council's practice of deciding questions 
unanimously, one might argue, ought to lead the Court to inter-
pret citizens' access in broader terms, since there is little chance 
that any of the Member States which have been deeply involved 
in the horsetrading would subsequently question the validity of 
their compromise in an article 173 action. Nor is there any partic-
ular reason to believe that the EEC Commission would use its 
power to trigger judicial review. Statistics clearly prove both 
these points. 
These considerations amply support Stein and Vining's 
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rejection of the "political compromise" argument. To be sure, 
their rejection assumes that relatively insignificant Council ac-
tions, routine regulations, and other "only" administrative acts 
are often of little political import. The points I have made, how-
ever, are no less valid with respect to actions against genuinely 
legislative acts. 
In their search for a rationale, Stein and Vining then suggest 
"that the inherent aversion of administrators everywhere . . . to 
judicial control" may explain the Court's reluctance to allow indi-
viduals standing (p.123). The authors might have added that the 
Council is not only an administrative agency, but the Com-
munity's foremost political organ. Since its decisional process 
presumably would be inhibited if decisions might later undergo 
judicial scrutiny on private initiative, the Council would disfavor 
a broad right to judicial review. The authors note that attorneys 
for the Council and the Commission "have been uncompromising 
and consistent in their opposition to plaintiff standing" (p.123). 
They add that even the United States Supreme Court would 
hesitate to decide a controversial case against both Congress and 
the Executive (p.123). 
Addressing the latter argument first, I would retort that one 
ought to be especially cautious in arguing by analogy from the 
American experience in this particular respect. The European 
Court's express power of judicial review has no equivalent in the 
United States Constitution; the Supreme Court exercises judicial 
review only as a matter of constitutional practice, however well-
established that practice might be. 
If the attorneys for Community ·Institutions favor a very nar-
row interpretation of the standing requirements, commentators 
have almost unanimously taken the opposite view. The Court's 
Advocates General have likewise supported plaintiffs' claims that 
the Court should at least hear the substance of their cases. In any 
case, since no empirical evidence supports this "administrator's 
aversion" argument, its bearing on the Court's rationale is proba-
bly not strong. 
One potential difficulty that confronted the Community in 
its formative years was that most of its subjects lacked loyalty to 
it or a serise of solidarity with its fate. Powerful companies and 
interest groups presumably would not have been expected to per-
mit the Community to curtail their freedom; they would combat 
the new body with all available means. One means of opposition 
would be to seek judicial review frequently, even in frivolous 
cases. 
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It is far from evident that these fears lacked substance. In 
fact, experience under the ECSC's more liberal provision for indi-
vidual access to judicial review justifies the fears that foes of the 
Community would abuse the liberal access to judicial review. 
Presumably such abuse was prompted by the belief that as long 
as the validity of Community acts was subject to litigation, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce them. Such abuse 
could have proved catastrophic for the young Community, which 
needed all the legitimacy successful enforcement could provide it. 
The result would have been a vicious circle operating in favor of 
th~ Community's foes.9 Thus, in the early 1960s, when the first 
annulment cases were filed against the Community, considera-
tions of legitimacy may have influenced the Court to deny almost 
totally a citizen's right to standing. 
What is the situation today? I feel that the Community has 
been sufficiently successful to generate a not insubstantial loyalty 
and solidarity. If my assessment is correct, the Court has consid-
erably less need today to interpret the standing requirements 
narrowly. The Court has shown no signs, however, that it is recon-
sidering its interpretation. 
If the standing requirements were interpreted more liberally, 
the Court would not, in my opinion, have to wait long for cases. 
Presumably, the Court's interpretation of those requirements has 
deterred a good deal of litigation. Parenthetically, therefore, I 
disagree with Stein and Vining when they suggest that the Com-
munity's regulatory power is too limited in scope to produce 
enough pressure on the Court to redefine its standing require-
ments (p.125). 
Precedent, unbroken for more than fifteen years, indicates 
that the Court is unwilling to ease the citizen's access to judicial 
review, no matter how many litigants knock on the Court's door. 
This is presumably so because the Court evidently has a long-
term interest in reshaping the judiciary of the Community to 
allow itself to act as the high appellate court of Community law, 
with the courts and tribunals of Member States and any adminis-
trative and other courts which the Community might create act-
ing as courts of first instance. This interest weighs against the 
citizen's interest .in a direct access to the Court. Considerable 
9. The authors point out on page 116 that "in the Communities the institutions are 
brittle and as yet have little grass roots participation" whereas "[i]n the United States 
there is little question about the basic legitimacy of the governmental institutions ••• ," 
The authors, however, do not relate this observation to their search for a rationale for the 
Court's negative attitude toward standing for private individuals. 
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empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. 
First, the Court not only restricts the citizen's access to judi-
cial review of legislative and administrative acts; it also restricts 
the right of private individuals under article 175·, paragraph 3, to 
seek an injunction against an institution which disregards an 
obligation to act under Community law. Several individuals have 
sought such injunctions, but the Court has dismissed all of the 
suits, primarily on the ground that the parties did not satisfy the 
article's standing requirement. The importance of the Court's 
denials of access to private parties lies in the virtual absence of 
litigation between the Member States and Community Institu-
tions under articles 173 and 175: The Court has reduced to an 
absolute minimum the number of cases brought under these arti-
cles, thereby reducing the frequency with which, pursuant to the 
Treaty, it must act as a court of first instance. 
Second, for many years, the Court was equally unsympa-
thetic to damage suits brought under article 178, in most in-
stances on the grounds that they attempted to circumvent 
article 173's narrow standing requirements.10 In the early 1970s 
the Court ostensibly shifted its position, more liberally inter-
preting the provisions that allow private persons to sue the 
Community for damages. 11 Despite this apparent shift, the Court 
has, for two reasons, clearly disappointed the expectations of pri-
vate plaintiffs. First, the Court defined the conditions for Com-
munity liability so narrowly that no private party has yet been 
awarded damages. 12 Second, the Court har;; found alternative 
means to inhibit private suits. For example, in suits alleging that 
a government agency has denied the plaintiff a benefit on the 
basis of an illegal Community law, the Court has held that since 
the allegedly injurious decision was made by a national agency, 
the plaintiff must first sue the national government in its own . 
courts. Once again the Court's desire to have another court act 
in the first instance as judge of both law and fact is clearly dis-
cernible. 
The denial of a remedy under article 173 is thus parallelled 
by the unavailability of remedies under articles 175 and 178. This 
10. van Gerven, The Legal Protection of Private Parties, in EUROPEAN LAw AND 
THE INDIVIDUAL 1, 9 (F. Jacobs ed. 1976). 
11. Id. at 11. 
12. See, e.g., Firma Bayerische HNL. Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH v. The Counsil 
and the Commission, No. 83, 94/76 & 4, 15, 40/77 [1978] E.C.R. 1209 (May 25, 1978), 
where the Court rejected a damage claim for losses suffered by the plaintiff as a result of 
enforcement of a regulation· which the Court earlier had annulled on equal protection 
grounds. 
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parallelism strongly supports, in my opinion, the validity of the 
hypothesis that these denials are but elements of the Court's 
overall plan to establish itself as a sort of high appellate court 
on matters of Community law. 
A memorandum prepared by the Court in 1978 also supports 
my hypothesis. The memorandum was intended to convince the 
Council of Ministers of the need for basic changes in the Court's 
powers, organization, and procedures. The Court stated: 
At the present time the Court is one of the first and last 
instance in all cases. For staff cases steps are already being taken 
to set up an administrative tribunal of first instance against whose 
decisions an appeal will lie to the Court only on a point of 
law .... 
The Court accepts that it should retain its present jurisdiction 
in cases such as against Member States for failure to fulfill Treaty 
obligations, actions for annullment brought by Member States or 
Community Institutions and-in any event-references for prelim-
inary rulings. On the other hand it may be thought that certain 
other categories"Of cases-such as cases brought by private persons 
in competition matters [articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty] or 
for ·damages [articles 178 and 215 of the Treaty] might in future 
be the. subject of an arrangement similar to that at present envis-
aged for staff cases. 
It is clear, I believe, that the Court should remain the sole 
judge of cases brought against Member States for Treaty infrac-
tions. What the Court seeks in its memorandum, therefore, is to 
be released from its remaining duties as a court of first instance. 
It would like to avoid its present duty to act as such a court in 
cases where a Community Institution specifically addresses its 
decision to the plaintiff (article 173); the Commission's decisions 
in antitrust cases under articles 85 and 86 · are the only really 
important cases in this category. The Court would also prefer that 
a lower court first hear and decide claims for damages. The 
Court's proposal to have "staff cases" removed from its docket 
has already been implemented, although the administrative tri-
bunal established for that purpose is not yet functioning. 
By implication, the memorandum suggests the Court is will-
ing to act as a court of first instance in the other areas enumer-
ated in the Treaty but·not discussed in the memorandum. It is 
reasonable to assume that this willingness is intimately con-
nected with its belief that in these remaining areas it has suc-
ceeded in limiting the number of such cases to the necessary 
minimum. 
In sum, injured private parties have no choice but to file suit 
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before their own national courts. In turn, the national courts 
should, in the opinion of the Court of Justice, seek preliminary 
rulings under article 177 where the Court's interpretation of rele-
vant Community law is desirable or required by law. The national 
courts should also refer to the Court for decision all questions 
about the validity of Community acts. 
In theory, then, the national courts will try most cases on 
their merits, and the Court of Justice will be the ultimate arbiter 
on questions of law. It is no secret, however, that·when making 
preliminary rulings the Court often transgresses this abstract bor-
derline between the two jurisdictions. Often the Court sufficiently 
weaves together its analysis of questions of law and its considera-
tion of facts that the national judge has little flexibility in making 
his final decision. 13 
The Court's memorandum mirrors this view when it suggests 
that the proposed reforms would have the advantages 
not only of bringing the Community judicial system more into line 
with those of the Member States but also-and above all-of mak-
ing the Court to a large extent the judge of questions of law rather 
than of fact so concentrating its activities on what is its true and 
main role within the framework of the Community. The function 
of the Court would thus be limited in this field to hearing appeals 
on questions of law brought before it against decisions of the new 
court of first instance.14 
One important reason for the Court's desire to limit its role 
to deciding questions of law is its multilingual nature. For in-
stance, the Danish government insists on using Danish whenever 
it appears before the Court as a party or intervenor. Imagine the 
difficulties if a witness does not understand the language of the 
examining attorney. Even more difficult are cases requiring si-
multaneous translation; in some situations, the spoken language 
cannot be translated directly into the desired languages because, 
for technical reasons, it must first be interpreted into certain 
intermediate languages. 
Even disregarding the linguistic hurdles that confront the 
13. It may be more than mere coincidence that in very recent decisions the Court 
refrains from discussing article 177's underlying assumption of cooperation between the 
Court and the courts of Member States. See, e.g., Pigs Marketing Board, No. 83/78 (Ct. 
of Justice for European Communities, Nov. 11, 1978). Professor Gerhard Casper has said 
"that the Court ... had demonstrated the ease with which article 177 could be turned 
into a vehicle for appellate review." 1978 PRoc. AM. Socv. !NTL. L. 171. 
14. (Emphasis added). The Ministers actually disapproved the Court's proposals. 
Declaration of Oct. 9, 1978. 
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Court, fact-finding, as everyone knows, can be extremely time-
consuming. Statistics show that the cases which the Court hears 
as a court of first instance consume considerably more time than 
cases involving preliminary rulings. On the average, the Court 
takes seven months to hand down a preliminary ruling, while it 
normally takes from twelve to eighteen months to decide a direct 
action. A major reason for this difference is that in suits seeking 
preliminary rulings, the national judge has already established 
the facts of the case. In view of the Court's growing workload, the 
need for reforms which would release the Court from the cumber-
some task of fact-finding has become increasingly compelling.u 
Finally, the Court may have wanted to strengthen the power 
of the Community's judicial branch to enforce more efficiently 
the Community's laws in the Member States. The best approach, 
the Court might well believe, would be for the courts of the Mem-
ber States to assume the initial enforcement responsibility, with 
the Court of Justice available for appeals. To encourage this de-
velopment, the Court has joined its denials of direct access to 
itself with liberal grants of access for individuals to national 
courts-an access perhaps well beyond the anticipations of the 
Treaty's Framers and beyond what the courts of the Member 
States will always be willing to live up to. 18 
That the Court is consciously trying to "federalize" the 
courts of Member States has not been proved above, and proba-
bly cannot be proved at all. The Court probably refers to a need 
for a cohesive hierarchy of Community courts which incorporates 
those of the Member States when it talks about "bringing the 
Community judicial system more into line with those of the 
Member States. " 17 
The Court thus apparently hopes to reserve for itself the role 
of a supreme court of law to which appeals in the form of prelimi-
nary rulings under article 177 may be taken from rulings of lower 
15. The Court heard 19 cases in 1957, 110 in 1974, 164 in 1977, and 156 during the 
first six months of 1978. The number of decisions was 78 in 1975, 88 in 1976, 100 in l!J77, 
and 60 during the first six months of 1978. 
16. From the very outset, according to Stein and Vining, the Court has defined access 
to national courts for the purpose of enforcing individual rights derived from Community 
law in a most liberal way, one far beyond what may have been the intent of the authors 
of the Treaty. They correctly see this as particularly appropriate to the "symbiotic Com-
munity system" (p. 124). The Court, however, occasionally has met with vehement resist-
ance from some of the highest courts of the Member States; see, e.g., the decision in the 
Cohn-Bendit case by the French Conseil d'Etat, Section du Contentieux, of Dec. 22, 1978 
(refusal to enforce a provision of an EEC directive contrary to French law). 
17. See text at note 15 supra. 
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Community courts and of the courts of the Member States. Thus 
far, the Court has answered all preliminary submissions from 
domestic courts. In response to its growing caseload, however, the 
Court might in the future be compelled to develop a practice of 
dismissals of some requests for preliminary rulings on the ground 
that no question has been raised under article 177, much as the 
United States Supreme Court exercises its discretionary power. 
CONCLUSION 
Paradoxically, the courts of the Member States have become 
the principal guardians of Community law. They have become so 
much so that they are no longer free to follow their traditional 
procedures for determining the applicability of national laws 
when plaintiffs claim that those laws are inconsistent with the 
Member State's Community obligations.18 It is even fair to con-
clude that without the legal protection which the national courts 
afford the citizen who seeks judicial review of Community legisla-
tion or administrative acts and the citizen who sues for damages, 
Community law would be lettre morte. Whatever strong interests 
the Court may have had in promoting this development, citizens 
ought at least to have direct access to the Court in those merito-
rious cases where no national remedy is available, whether be-
cause of a lack of standing or simply because no remedy exists.19 
The Court could well be shaping a European system of appel-
late jurisdiction. While this may be a wise judicial policy, it un-
deniably and substantially departs from the structure envisaged 
by the Framers of the European Communities. 
18. It did so in Administrazione Delle Finanze v. Simmenthal, [1978) E.C.R. 629. 
19. That the Court is acutely aware of this problem may be seen, in particular, in its 
case law under article 178. This is the main reason why the Court apparently still hesitates 
before it definitely settles the terms of its practice of dismissals. 
